Bashar al-Assad's fall is far from inevitable: past Middle Eastern uprisings have failed more often than succeeded
Chris Phillips
guardian.co.uk, Tuesday 6 March 2012 16.53 GMT
Article history
Members of the Free Syrian army deployed in Homs, February 29, 2012. Photograph: Stringer/Reuters
There is an assumption that Bashar al-Assad's military solution to the current crisis in Syria is hopeless – that no matter how many centres of resistance like Baba Amr he brutally crushes, the opposition won't be quelled and the fall of his regime, whether it takes months or years, is inevitable.
Yet there are recent examples where Arab governments have repressed uprisings and won. With the exception of Libya, when rebels toppled the incumbent regime only with the aid of Nato support, almost all insurgencies have ended in failure.
Assad already has one template to follow: his father's crushing of the Muslim Brotherhood in 1976-82. Other successful violent strategies in the region, such as Saddam Hussein's suppression of the Iraqi Shia rebellion in 1991 and the Algerian government's victory in the civil war of 1991-2000, may also persuade the regime it can hold on.
Are the conditions that allowed those regimes to survive different enough from contemporary Syria to give the opposition hope, or would Assad be right to believe that history is on his side?
The strength of the security forces compared with a weak opposition is one reason why embattled regimes favour the military option. For a long time the demonstrators in Syria resembled the Shia uprising against Saddam in 1991: a spontaneous, uncoordinated rebellion against the regime.
The Iraqi Shia were, in fact, in a stronger position than Syria's demonstrators today as they successfully liberated great swaths of southern Iraq for a time. In spite of this, a loyal core of Saddam's Republican Guard reconquered all lost territory within weeks, killing tens of thousands.
Cultivating loyal units was a tactic utilised by Hafez Assad as well, using his brother Rifaat's Defence Companies throughout 1976-82. Today, President Bashar has regularly utilised loyal fourth armoured division troops (headed by his own brother, Maher) in Baba Amr and elsewhere – suggesting that this survival technique has been noted.
Even when facing armed opposition, which the Assad regime now does, past Arab governments have overcome far greater threats than that currently posed by the Free Syrian Army (FSA). It took the Algerian government nine years and up to 200,000 deaths to overcome Islamist militia in its civil war, while it took Hafez al-Assad's regime six years and up to 60,000 deaths, but both regimes eventually held.
Even with the prospect of Qatar and Saudi Arabia arming the FSA, the Syrian rebels are unlikely to reach the parity with regime forces needed for a military victory unless they persuade sizeable chunks to defect with equipment. Without major external support, as with Libya, precedent would suggest either a regime victory or at best a civil war stalemate.
Importantly, in all three past cases the core of the regime held together under the pressure of an uprising. In Iraq, where Saddam faced a simultaneous rebellion from Kurds in the north, his core Sunni constituency, key members of his inner circle and the security forces all stayed loyal.
The same was true in Hafez's Syria during the Muslim Brothers' uprising, particularly because of the loyalty of the Damascus merchant class.
In Algeria, the military took power in a coup in 1992 and retained enough establishment support for the state to function throughout the civil war.
For now, the Syrian regime also shares these traits. Its social base has shrunk but its core support, particularly members of Syria's religious minorities led by Assad's Alawi sect, has stayed loyal or neutral. The military has not splintered, with conscripts rather than officers or whole units defecting, and the merchant and middle classes of Aleppo and Damascus have remained quiet. Unlike Gaddafi's Libya, which disintegrated very quickly, the Ba'athist state continues to function. Assad may, therefore, equate his regime with those of Algeria, Iraq and his father's that survived an uprising.
However, key differences may yet undo Assad. For one, the international and regional community are more mobilised against Assad than they were against either the Algerian government or that of Assad's father. In the past, too, tight control on the press ensured only piecemeal media coverage, unlike the constant stream of brutal YouTube footage outraging international public opinion today.
At present, the regime seems to believe that such pressure can be weathered, perhaps hoping that the international community will repeat the climbdown that was seen in Iraq in 1991: calling for an uprising against Saddam but limiting action to a no-fly zone over Iraqi Kurdistan and economic sanctions that hurt the people more than the regime.
However, both the global and regional stance may change if the slaughter continues, confronting the regime with either direct military intervention or a concerted attempt to arm the rebels.
The second question is whether Assad can continue to keep a critical mass of public opinion on his side or, at least, not actively against him. The Algerian government and Hafez both faced a credible Islamist threat, whose atrocities rallied support for the regime.
Contrary to regime propaganda, the majority of FSA fighters are not Islamists, and atrocities are being committed by the regime rather than the opposition. Even if the regime's minority core stays loyal, fearing retribution and a loss of privilege, will the silent majority of Syrians, particularly in central Damascus and Aleppo, accept many more Baba Amrs?
The more the regime kill, the more they risk affecting extended families in other cities, widening the opposition. Recent demonstrations in the previously loyal middle-class district of Mezze in Damascus suggest the tide of public support may yet turn, particularly if the economy continues to decline under the weight of sanctions and unrest.
For now, however, as with Algeria, Iraq and his father before him, the pillars of Bashar's regime remain in place. Recent historical examples in the region illustrate how difficult it is to unseat a ruling regime without the assistance of western firepower. In its absence, those seeking to topple Assad must thus consider how best to erode those pillars in a manner least damaging to Syria in the long run.
For those wondering about Assad's next move, however, policymakers could do worse than look at the past Algerian, Iraqi and Syrian examples for a dictator's handbook on how to survive an uprising.
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26 comments, displaying
cbarr
6 March 2012 5:04PM
There is a key difference the contest between the Soviet Union and the USA is long over and the equipment sitting in hands like those of the Syrian regime is starting to look dated. His troops aren't battle hardened like Saddam's where the international community has isolated Assad meaning he can't buy arms like the Algierians could. All of this would suggest his millitary dominance may hold for the time being but an influx of modern anti tank and anti-air rockets would cripple his regime and Saudi have the capacity to do that along with providing the advisors to help the Free Syrian Army in using these weapons. Assad still does have an ace in the hole but its one that could lead to an immediate international intervention and that is his chemical weapons program he could gas his enemies into submission. Though his regime would probably either be anhiliated by outside agents or be isolated for etternity until sanctions brought his government to its knees anyway. The world won't turn away like it did when Saddam killed the Kurds the geopolitical atmosphere has changed I don't think Assad's millitary dominance is so assured if the arms embargo is broken and the Free Syrian Army can gain the weapons to compete
renfroo96
6 March 2012 5:12PM
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KravMaga
6 March 2012 5:12PM
Assad already has one template to follow: his father's crushing of the Muslim Brotherhood in 1976-82. Other successful violent strategies in the region, such as Saddam Hussein's suppression of the Iraqi Shia rebellion in 1991 and the Algerian government's victory in the civil war of 1991-2000,
Good point, but these suppressions occurred in the pre-internet, pre-Facebook and pre-cell phone era.
I'm not sure if unrestrained brutality will be as effective for Assad today.
robertblue
6 March 2012 5:19PM
Good article well balanced
May I suggest the writer look at how the likes of Saudi Arabia & other gulf states manage to maintain there anti democratic stranglehold on their countrys especially with the radically opposing tribal problems that exist
It would certainly make an interesting article
44Kicks
6 March 2012 5:26PM
There is an assumption that Bashar al-Assad's military solution to the current crisis in Syria is hopeless
Not sure about that - I assume the complete opposite. This is an uprising of a minority and is unlikely to suceed. The west (backing Saudi Arabis and Qatar) rightly does not intend to intervene to any great extent but is happy to encourage the rebels and give them a false sense of support that will prolonge the conflict and lead to increased casualties and atrocities - on both sides. As with their other foe in the region, Iran, their strategy is not to attack but to cause internal instability and weaken the state of syria so as to consolidate their own power. It goes without saying that they couldn't give a sh*t about the people of syria.
Largo1
6 March 2012 5:29PM
Yes they can and they will as long as they are able to, still it is not our concern
edwardrice
6 March 2012 5:30PM
Contrary to regime propaganda, the majority of FSA fighters are not Islamists, and atrocities are being committed by the regime rather than the opposition.
The problem is the Islamist's sponsors, Saudi Arabia and Qatar, are threatening
to arm the 'FSA fighters' and invade. Such warmongering from US puppet regimes
cannot be helpful
zionysus
6 March 2012 5:30PM
NO! suggests history! really it is so pitiful to look at Syria as an island without understanding geopolitical and geostrategic motivation. look at Libya, Iraq, Afghanistan... if you want to see what history promises.
more drum beating for war. have you cif people got an endless supply of this stuff?
dirkbruere
6 March 2012 5:44PM
The real question is whether the Syrian people would be better off if we bombed the shit out of them then installed a puppet regime headed by whatever militia comes out on top. See Libya.
showmaster
6 March 2012 5:50PM
We really should mind our own business over Syria but it would be interesting to know why the Kurds haven't taken advantage of the situation to create some mayhem.
They are usually pretty astute about these things and have a history with the regime.
TempleCloud
6 March 2012 5:52PM
Can the Syrian regime crush the uprising?
Well if they don't give a damn about the number of deaths they cause, and the manner in which they cause them, then yes, easily. We can only hope that the Syrian opposition, which must mostly be those of a different strand of Arab-Muslim affiliation and the generally pissed-off, realise this sooner rather than later because the west are too busy to do anything else about it and so far Putin is busy slamming-down his own disaffected and the Chinese are reluctant.
What is astounding about the sudden western zeal for liberation homogeny is the immediacy with which it is deemed required. Dangerous stuff. Of course, like Libya, the tipping point is not easy to quantify. A precondition of our intervention however must be how tightly the despot controls the military and how loyal they are
TempleCloud
6 March 2012 5:54PM
Response to dirkbruere, 6 March 2012 5:44PM
The real question is whether the Syrian people would be better off if we bombed the shit out of them then installed a puppet regime headed by whatever militia comes out on top. See Libya.
And of course, who do we ask? and what weight do we give the various answers? It's a shite situation whatever happens.
boredscientist
6 March 2012 5:56PM
Response to dirkbruere, 6 March 2012 5:44PM
Who cares!
NATO wants to bomb them and they will
goodgamem8s
6 March 2012 5:57PM
Response to dirkbruere, 6 March 2012 5:44PM
The real question is whether the Syrian people would be better off if we bombed the shit out of them then installed a puppet regime headed by whatever militia comes out on top. See Libya.
This would be a great post if it were true:
1) We bombed the shit out of the Libyan people.
2) The new regime were a puppet regime.
3) The new puppet regime is also, bizarrely, an unpredictable (Islamic?) milita.
But it isn't, and it isn't.
TurgidTruth
6 March 2012 5:58PM
Yet there are recent examples where Arab governments have repressed uprisings and won. With the exception of Libya, when rebels toppled the incumbent regime only with the aid of Nato support, almost all insurgencies have ended in failure.
Fiddlesticks. (Didn't a Guardian editor vet this post).
Egypt.
Tunisia.
Yemen.
NunOfTheAbove
6 March 2012 5:59PM
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TurgidTruth
6 March 2012 6:00PM
Response to dirkbruere, 6 March 2012 5:44PM
The real question is whether the Syrian people would be better off if we bombed the shit out of them then installed a puppet regime headed by whatever militia comes out on top. See Libya.
Or more rationally - The real question is whether the Syrian people would be better off with a government composed of those who are fighting Assad at this moment.
You have been assimilating too much 'Guardian'.
maiaH
6 March 2012 6:11PM
1. We armed, funded and encouraged the southern swamp arab and northern kurdish rebellions in Iraq, then withdrew suddenly and left them to be slaughtered. It was artificial therefore that that rebellion started at all, left to themselves they would have realised they had neither enough weaponry nor enough support.
2. We are trying to destabilise the country hard, that is the whole point of the sanctions, to make sure ordinary people starve and rebel. Sick.
JanBurton
6 March 2012 6:13PM
Only the impact of public opinion is keeping Assad from really taking the gloves off.
Notice how Syrian air force jets haven't taken to the skies yet, so as to abvoid giving NATO an excuse for a no-fly zone.
Assad can definately win this thing so long as Syrians fear what comes next - and they have every right to fear.
duroi
6 March 2012 6:19PM
Bashar al-Assad's fall is far from inevitable: past Middle Eastern uprisings have failed more often than succeeded
Indeed. Look no further than Bahrain where the Saudis quelled a popular uprising and butchered the rebels by sending their army to preserve the rule of the Bahrain royal family (who are related to the Al-Sauds).
The US, EU and UK didn't raise this at the UN, nor did the BBC cover the massacres and torture in Bahrain. The Saudis are after all the good guys, our valued allies who buy weapons from us.
sjxt
6 March 2012 7:18PM
Good, balanced article that covers the bases - there has been far to much wishful thinking along the lines "Assad is bad and most of his country is against him so he is bound to lose". At the moment, by his own lights, things are looking like they are going his way.
The Syrian Opposition are in a dreadful position. Unless they militarise they will likely be crushed. But what the Algerian example, in particular, shows is that militarisation of an opposition in the face of government terror carries its own risks of radicalisation and then critical loss of public support. When the Algerian civil war began the opposition, like the Syrian, was a broadly based and overwhelmingly peaceful movement that expected to take power through the ballot box. Once the military cancelled the elections, banned public protest, and arrested the moderate leadership, more militant leaders emerged in the furnace of the fight against the government, and by turning violence not only on government forces but also government civilian supporters, they end up fatally compromising the movement in the eyes of the population at large.
The Syrian opposition seem very aware of this, with their condemnation of Al Quaeda's offer of help and their wariness of the Saudis and Qataris. But the more the violence escalates the more power naturally gravitates to the men with the guns. And Assad also seems aware of this too - his forces seem to be going out of their way to sectarianise the conflict.
All in all, Assad still has the stronger hand.
dirkbruere
6 March 2012 8:10PM
Response to TurgidTruth, 6 March 2012 6:00PM
"Or more rationally - The real question is whether the Syrian people would be better off with a government composed of those who are fighting Assad at this moment.
You have been assimilating too much 'Guardian'.
No, the real question is whether would should fight yet another war in the Middle East.
Plus, does Assad have no support at all amongst the Syrian people?
mribvb
6 March 2012 8:17PM
The fact that the West took so long to intervene in regards to the Civil War in the Former Yugoslavia doesn't bode well for the Syrian Rebels. I think it'll come down to if there's the continued steady desertion of troops and equipment with deeper Civil War and the escalating force and desperate measure that the regime will have to resort to. There could be a point where the violence is too much for most of the Syrian Army to actually carry out or too hard for the outside world to bare. Given how little's been done and the opposition of both Russia and China, widespread civilian slaughter looks likely and if Assad survives he'll be gravely weakened and if the West fails to intervene it could be the radical Islamic elements of the Rebels that prove successful in a devastated State. Neither of those outcomes look viable for either Syria or the West long term.
blackmafia
6 March 2012 8:18PM
Syria where is your Arab, Turkish bothers? Their problem not ours, time the Middle East stood up and be counted. Done three wars over the last 20 years, UK please do not get involved. Libya are killing Black africans because of skin
blackmafia
6 March 2012 8:20PM
Response to TurgidTruth, 6 March 2012 5:58PM
Vey true and Libya is a mess now, we will be back there soon
blackmafia
6 March 2012 8:21PM
Response to boredscientist, 6 March 2012 5:56PM
No we don't, the bombs cast to much, let the Arabs and turks sort out please.
____________
WHAT DO YOU THINK ?
And from "Syria shockwaves sweep across Middle East":
"Now that Bashar al-Assad is crushing opposition with terrible brutality, no one in the West knows how to deal with him"
Syrian president Bashar al-Assad's reaction to protests has left those in the West unsure of how to deal with him. Photograph: Bulent Kilic/AFP/Getty Images
and
Protesters gather in the city of Banias, where Syrian tanks are reported to have opened fire on demonstrators. Photograph: Ho/Reuters
also
A Syrian says he was detained in Bashar al-Assad's torture chambers, beaten over a 12-hour period and denied sleep. Photograph: Mohamed Abd El Ghany/Reuters
and more than 7500 syrians had been killed and NOW, every day, many syrians are still to be KILLED brutally
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