JOURNAL SENTINEL
OPINION
Time to reassess U.S. strategy in Mideast and reduce divisions at home
Associated Press
Thick smoke from an airstrike by U.S.-led coalition forces rises in Kobani, Syria at the Turkey-Syria border on Thursday. Kobani and its surrounding areas have been under assault by extremists of the Islamic State group since mid-September and are being defended by Kurdish fighters.
By Thomas Mcnamara
Oct. 25, 2014 4:00 p.m.
With almost all our armed forces out of Afghanistan and Iraq, we are entering a postwar period when we should reassess our national interests and strategies. Events in Syria and Iraq make it more necessary and urgent, given our air offensive against the Islamic State group.
It is time to reassess our strategic position in the Middle East and in the wider Islamic world. We must, as a nation, come to an understanding of our regional commitments, our capabilities and our leadership role. Without an articulated strategy, we will react tactically to events. In such circumstances, we will certainly see more outcomes that match the poor results in Afghanistan and Iraq.
We justifiably invaded Afghanistan and expelled Taliban and al-Qaida from Kabul, although neither was destroyed. Unfortunately, we plunged into Afghanistan without clear, limited objectives and have been mired for a dozen years in nation-building and Afghan-Pakistani politics. Our efforts there were undercut by our conflicted ally, Pakistan, which has supported the Taliban and protected al-Qaida leaders in Pakistan. Despite those errors, we were relatively successful, finally, against al-Qaida. But, we did not achieve our original objective of destroying it.
Without finishing in Afghanistan, we heedlessly and unjustifiably invaded Iraq, ostensibly to remove terrorists and weapons of mass destruction, but really in a futile attempt to restructure politics and culture in Iraq and the Middle East. Over the course of a decade, we succeeded in roiling Middle East politics, unsettling oil markets, undercutting our supporters, weakening our influence and motivating extreme Islamic movements and jihadist recruits. Iraq was a strategic error for which we will pay for years to come.
It is critically important that we not start another military intervention in the Middle East without carefully — and publicly — noting our options, defining our objectives, assessing our capabilities and articulating our strategy. Not to do so will result in further deterioration of our economic, political, military and moral strength.
The current situation
The Middle East today is a cauldron of violent history, religions, ideologies, theologies, nationalism and social discontents. The Islamic State group is a symptom of the disease, not the cause. Hence, its destruction will not resolve the turmoil that convulses the Islamic world. As the Islamic State surpassed al-Qaida, so also, unless the underlying causes are addressed, a replacement will come should the Islamic State decline.
Although our stated objective is to "degrade and destroy" the Islamic State, we know with certainty that we cannot do that with current capabilities available to us. We are using American air power (but no "boots on the ground") against the Islamic State. We have no solid commitments from regional states for ground forces and other critical support. We entered knowing that this is a brutal and uncompromising Islamic civil war, the end of which is impossible to foresee.
Our potential regional partners vacillate because each has very different and conflicting objectives. The inability of the U.S. and Iran to work together weakens both nations and strengthens Islamic State. Effective ground operations in Syria are unlikely. Inside Iraq disparate, partisan militias have little or no loyalty to Baghdad. All these factors indicate we are doing what we did in Afghanistan and Iraq, announcing objectives that exceed our capabilities.
Yet, the Islamic State is not an existential threat to the West. The Soviet Union was such a threat during the Cold War. The Islamic State is, however, an existential threat to the Islamic regimes in the Arab world and, should it succeed, to Islamic regimes outside the Middle East. Yet these very nations seem incapable of overcoming rivalries to confront this threat.
Our biggest weakness, however, is the bitter, partisan disputes poisoning our domestic politics at all levels. The politics of absolutism have immobilized us politically and economically, and undercut our influence abroad. A war-weary American public deserves better. It should discuss and debate our strategy before we plunge into this murky, complex conflict.
What is to be done
Given that we are now engaged, and that we know we cannot succeed by air power alone, more modest, achievable objectives are called for. At this stage, a better objective for us would state: We intend to blunt the advances of the Islamic State to give time to its many opponents to cooperate, with American support and assistance, in offensive ground action.
These modest goals can make an effective strategy. These objectives are clearly stated and are in balance with available capabilities and resources. They are realistic and do not overstate our commitment. Americans must realize that inflated objectives are a curse on national security policy.
This strategy contains clear signals to regional and non-regional powers. American engagement depends on their engagement. We will engage further only when adequate commitments and coordinated efforts are established, i.e. when additional capabilities and resources are brought to bear.
Iran is important to this effort. Mutual cooperation in defeating a common enemy, the Islamic State, can enhance prospects for success and, if joined to success in negotiating the nuclear problem, can reduce the hostility and mistrust in our bilateral relationship and increase stability in the Mideast.
Meanwhile, we need to reduce our bitter, partisan divisions at home if we are to engage constructively in a strategic discourse. Partisanship must be controlled, or we will not act in accord with our national interests, which should be our guide in such efforts. The public must understand that domestic reform is essential because our position in the world depends critically on the strength and unity of the nation at home.
Lacking that unity, no amount of military, diplomatic or economic action can succeed in the Mideast — or elsewhere.
Thomas McNamara, a retired career diplomat, served President Ronald Reagan and President George H.W. Bush on the NCS staff and as ambassador to Colombia. He was assistant secretary of state for political-military affairs from 1994 to 1998. From the Carter administration through the Obama administration, he has held numerous senior government positions in the White House, State Department and the intelligence community.
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