4:04 pm ET Sep 19, 2014
Think Tank
3 Vulnerabilities in Obama’s Strategy to Fight ISIS–and How to Fix Them
By BRIAN KATULIS
An Islamic State loyalist waves a flag in Raqqa, Syria, this summer. Reuters
More debate is urgently needed about President Barack Obama’s evolving strategy to defeat the Islamic State in Iraq and al-Sham, or ISIS. If the vulnerabilities in Mr. Obama’s strategy are not addressed, they could inflame a bad situation and, ultimately, the ripple effects could wreck the rest of Mr. Obama’s national-security agenda.
The president’s strategy has three components. In Syria, the policy is a reinvigorated effort to support third-way opposition forces to counter ISIS while also fighting Bashar al-Assad. In Iraq, the plan is to continue security assistance to Iraqi leaders, based on steps toward building a more inclusive government, while conducting targeted airstrikes against ISIS. The third plank is building a regional and international coalition to counter ISIS on multiple fronts: military strikes, support to various actors fighting the militants on the ground, targeted intelligence operations, and counter-propaganda efforts. Taken together, the components add up to a major strategic shift (in contrast to the president’s actions earlier this summer in Iraq).
Mr. Obama’s strategy places a premium on partnership and getting others to pull their weight, and it wisely seeks to avoid a costly military engagement involving ground troops. Few have offered better alternatives.
But each component of the president’s approach has major vulnerabilities.
The weakest plank remains U.S. policy on Syria, which still does not form a coherent strategy. The administration has yet to define a longer-term framework for the likely end state in Syria, one that can produce a sustainable political agreement ending the conflict. This is critical. Even ramped-up efforts to support Syria’s beleaguered opposition will take time, and implementation will be tough given those forces’ internal divisions and weak capacity. Without viable ground forces to help target possible airstrikes and conduct follow-up operations–as has been done in areas of Iraq–it will be difficult to define metrics for impact and success.
The strategy’s strongest components are those that apply to Iraq–which is saying a lot because the pathway forward in Iraq is by no means clear. The approach leans heavily on getting Iraqi leaders to produce a more politically inclusive government, one that addresses the grievances of Iraq’s minority Sunnis. This sounds good–but the experiences of the past 10 years suggest, unfortunately, that this may be wishful thinking. It is encouraging that Nouri al-Maliki stepped down as prime minister and that political negotiations continue, but recent challenges filling key defense and interior posts in the new government underscore the difficulties ahead. And that doesn’t include the potential challenges in reforming Iraq’s security services.
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The Obama administration should continue pressing for greater inclusiveness in Iraq and a more unified national response to ISIS, but it should also have a team sketching out alternatives. The U.S. should know by now that things don’t always work out as planned in Iraq–and we should anticipate Iraqis operating on their own timetable.
The third strategic component–efforts to build a coalition–is key: If successful, it could demonstrate that this is a shared battle against extremists by more pragmatic forces in the region. Early assessments of the likely partners point to some significant challenges in the coalition’s ability to produce tangible impact. The Middle East is riven by not only Shiite-Sunni divisions between regional heavyweights Iran and Saudi Arabia but also by divides among Sunni-majority states such as Turkey and Qatar on the one hand and the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia on the other. This regional Cold War has been playing out in Egypt and Libya among other places.
President Obama has taken a good step in appointing John Allen, the retired four-star Marine general, as his envoy to the global coalition, and Gen. Allen has a strong deputy in Ambassador Brett McGurk, who knows Iraq well. Unlike in 1991, when an international coalition was built to expel Iraqi forces from Kuwait, this conflict is more multifaceted. In addition to the regional divisions, there are capacity gaps among key coalition members.
Fighting ISIS will require dexterity and complicated action on multiple fronts. Moving efficiently and responding to changing dynamics is a challenge for any administration, especially one led by a president who is wisely deliberative and cautious. The U.S. will need to play a central quarterback role in the nascent coalition, which will require the White House to trust and empower its team to implement the game plan without too much micromanagement. There are advantages to the Obama administration’s distaste for rash moves. But sometimes its interagency process can be sluggish.
If the Obama team doesn’t move swiftly to address such vulnerabilities as the lack of trust between coalition partners and streamline its mode for implementing policy, its approach could inflame regional tensions. How the administration implements this strategic shift in its approach to the Middle East has consequences for the region and America’s role in the world.
The challenges inherent in executing this complicated strategy underscore the problem with Congress’s truncated debate on Mr. Obama’s strategy to fight ISIS. It’s not enough for America to discuss aid for Syria’s rebels. We need a broader debate about how all the pieces of Mr. Obama’s strategy fit together.
Brian Katulis is a senior fellow at the Center for American Progress. He is on Twitter: @katulis.
ALSO IN THINK TANK:
* Why Really Runs Obama’s Policy?
* Mystery Explained: Why Obama Is Tongue-Tied on Foreign Policy
* Why Risk Can Be a Good Thing in Foreign Policy
* Why U.S. Airstrikes in Iraq Are Not a Major Strategy Change
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