Tuesday, January 24, 2012

Q & A_ "Ian Black on Syria – live Q&A"

Ian Black on Syria – live Q&A

The Guardian's Middle East editor answered your questions on the Syrian crisis
Comments (55)

Ian Black
guardian.co.uk, Tuesday 24 January 2012 10.46 GMT
Article history



Syrian soldiers man a checkpoint in Homs. Photograph: Ahmed Jadallah/Reuters
Ten months after protesters first took to the streets calling for the resignation of President Bashar al-Assad, unrest in Syria continues unabated.

Thousands have been killed, and many fear that the uprising, which began with a group of schoolchildren daubing graffiti on a wall, is gradually transforming into a civil war.

The Guardian's Middle East editor, Ian Black, recently spent 10 days reporting in Syria in a rare visit to a country that has been in effect closed to foreign journalists for nearly a year.

While there, he interviewed regime officials and underground activists, witnessed the bloody aftermath of a bomb attack in Damascus, and visited the besieged town of Zabadani where opposition gunmen successfully fought off government troops.

Ian came online to answer your questions on the Syria crisis – and on the challenges of reporting in a closed but increasingly divided country.

From NasrallahsNightmare:
Hi Ian,

What is Saudi Arabia's percieved role in the situation? Both in the narrative of those you've met in the opposition and those supporting the regime? Detail would be greatly appreciated here.

Also, do you have any new information on the developing relations between the NCC and the SNC? What sort of compromises -if any- do you see necessary and possible for there to be a unified opposition movement? What would the role of the FSA be in this equation?

How is the conflicted sunni bourgeoisie handling/justifying its position in the big cities?

Thank you.

From IanBlack:
The Saudis are seen by both the Syrian government and opposition as being against the Assad regime, though they have until recently taken a backseat role compared to the Qataris. The Syrian government is especially hostile to Saudi-owned al-Arabiyya TV. It has also been incensed by broadcasts by Sheikh Adnan al-Arour, a former member of the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood who fled to Saudi Arabia in the early 1980s and has become a popular satellite television preacher with a wide following in Syria. Bitter Syrian-Saudi rivalry has been played out for years over Lebanon and relations with Iran. Syrians scorn Saudi support for change in Syria by pointing to the lack of fundamental freedoms in the kingdom, noit least for women. The Saudi decision to pull out of the Arab League monitoring mission was a significant escalation in favour of the anti-Assad camp.

Another question from NasrallahsNightmare:
Also, What are the thoughts of the protestors that you have met concerning both the NCC and SNC? How is the NCC working within the country? Are they monitored and restricted in their movement?

From IanBlack:

It is hard to gauge support for these two bodies on the ground in Syria. Activists from the local coordination committees, the tansiqiyyat, tend to see things locally - and as far as I know the SNC - dubbed the "Istanbul council" by the regime- has no formal or at least open presence on the ground. Its supporters certainly keep a low profile. But the SNC has certainly given help in areas such as Homs and Hama. The NCC by contrast operates openly and seems to be tolerated by the regime with occasional harrassment. I was able to meet Hassan Abdel-Azim, the NCC leader, at his Damascus office.

From Irishman45:

Do you believe the regime can actually crush the revolt, or has it got too much momentum and spread to too many cities to be fully crushed, so they can try and contain it, but that is best the regime can hope for?

From IanBlack:

The current consensus is that there seems to be a rough balance of forces between the two sides, though they are far from equal: the regime cannot crush the protests/uprising and the protestors cannot overthrow the regime. But a regime decision to deploy far greater force or significant foreign intervention could upset that equilibrium. And remember that at the moment 20-30 protestors/rebels are being killed on average every day, as well as smaller numbers of security force personnel.

From lanaca:

How are universities, either faculty or study body, in the anti-Assad protests? How is academic life now? Campus protests/crackdowns? Do you know of any scientists/academics leading protests?

From IanBlack:

Protests have been reported at universities in Damascus and Aleppo. I met students who had not been able to attend classes since last March either because they are living underground or unable to get to their place of study. I also met several academics and intellectuals involved in the protest movement.

From JollyBoy:

In your opinion, what is the likelihood that a full scale civil war will ensue if the Assad regime is overthrown? How much evidence of sectarian division did you see during your recent trip?

From IanBlack:

Opposition people were keen to stress that they are not sectarian and quick to accuse the regime of deliberately fomenting sectarian tensions in order to bolster its own position. That is easily done when so many senior figures in the security forces are drawn from Assad's own Alawite minority - maybe 10% of the population. In Homs, which I visited with government minders, there seems to have been a process of ethnic cleansing of previously mixed neighbourhoods. Christians have traditionally supported the regime and seen it as a defence against sectarianism. Regime supporters often stress the danger of Islamic extremism, citing Salafis and al-Qaida-type groups, but the extent of that seems to be deliberately exaggerated by the authorities. Sectarianism is a real issue in Syria, but it needs to be treated with caution: there are Alawites who oppose the regime and Sunnis who support it.

From disgraceofgod:

What is the general level of appetite among Syrians for foreign military intervention, and how has this changed in recent months?

According to your best available evidence, who was responsible for the two suicide bomb attacks on Damascus?

How significant a portion of the opposition do the Muslim Brotherhood and any other Islamist outfits constitute?

From IanBlack:

I heard people asking for protection without always knowing exactly what they wanted: talk of safe areas/ buffer zones and certainly weapons and equipment. I didn't meet anyone suggesting a foreign military presence on the ground.

There are a lot of unanswered questions about the Damascus bombings, especially about the al-Midan one on January 6 when i was there. Many Syrians assume that their government faked them to reinforce its narrative about facing a terrorist campaign and to intimidate people into halting protests. Lots of circumstantial evidence that adds up to significant doubts

The Muslim Brotherhood are part of the Syrian National Council. There is evidence of activity by Salafi groups too but it is very hard to gauge their significance.

From patasola:

How easy was it to report in Syria? Did you have a minder? Did you sense that people felt able to talk to you freely? Were people put in danger by talking to you? And how did you get to Zabadani?


From IanBlack:

Easy enough in central Damascus. I did not have a minder. I felt many ppl were speaking far more openly than ever before - I have been visiting Syrian for 25 years- but those at pro-govt rallies were nervous and cagey. I think ppl take far greater risks than talking to a foreign journalist.

From capmint1:

I'd also like to say glad your back safe, I read your account of the killing of french journalist, is there any truth to rumur that Syrian govt was not allowing journalists to wear own body armour (if so were govt issued offered as alternative); and do you have view on the french journalist who was in the same group, that the grenade was a govt set up (given a impartial investigation is very unlikely)?

From IanBlack:

Suicide bombing point addressed previously.
Arab League mission was far too weak to make a significant impact. A bigger mission with better training, equipment and powers could have.
Defections: agree with you. Nothing at a high enough level to really matter.
I assume some arms supplies getting through to FSA, but it still looks more like a local defence militia than a strategic challenge to govt.

From capmint1:

- Suicide bombings: Assad narrative is that it is a foriegn insuregency and he has played the AQ card, what is latest thinking on the recent suicide bombing bearing in mind Abdullah Azzam denied Dec 23 but havent issued formal denial yet?

- UN role v Arab League: UNSC reminds me off League of Nations in that it is divided, and therefore powerless, which leaves Arab League to act; but they have no history off peace keeping or monitoringhow do you view the Arab League mission, my own view, 50 was always going be to few, and not trained, but did they make a positive impact?

- Defections: what are the levels of defections to FSA given Assad has stacked allawites in officers, and used loyal divisions with allawites (excepting the goon squad thugs), what is the feel on the levels of defections, in my view media in low tens, hundreds, but so far, nothing on scale of Yonnis and his Interior Ministry troops in Libya (hence my view that external support via Libya and Qatar, Saudi are at least credible)?

- External actors: looking at the arms of FSA, indicates some smuggling from Lebanon; and assume for reasons posted that FSA are not just defectors, there are also a number of credible reports, including from ex CIA Philip Giraldi that Nato already shipping arms into Turkey, and Belhaj has a contingent of fighters (in 000s); do you have a view on credibility of these accounts given that Jalil has provided his approval, US implicit approval?

- can the FSA win, what is there end game as at moment, it looks like a long drawn out insurgency / civil war?

- how unified and representative are the SNC?

From IanBlack:

Suicide bombing point addressed previously.
Arab League mission was far too weak to make a significant impact. A bigger mission with better training, equipment and powers could have.
Defections: agree with you. Nothing at a high enough level to really matter.
I assume some arms supplies getting through to FSA, but it still looks more like a local defence militia than a strategic challenge to govt.

From credster:

How do Syrians feel about Iranian influence? How do they view their relationship with Iran? Do they worry that a distabilisied Syria leads to a weaker Iranian influence in the Levant and therefore a stronger US and Israeli presence?
I hear what you say about that influence not being decisive but could Syria become the battle ground between the west and Iran that Lebanon once was?

From IanBlack:

I would say that the roots of Syria's uprising are the grievances of its own people, like revolutions in Egypt, Tunisia etc. Don't believe it was started by US, Israel or anyone else. Yes, other govts have geopolitical interests - opposition to Iran etc- and are certainly pursuing own agendas. But they are not decisive. Assad's claim that the whole thing is a foreign conspiracy is nonsense.

From localsyrian:

Ian Black: we have seen millions of Syrians take to the street in support for their president, did you find out that the true support from the Syrian people for president Assad is in the Majority as they say ? and at what percentage would you put it in your judgment??

From IanBlack:

The first thing to say is that it is impossible to answer this question. It is not possible in current circumstances in Syria accurately to gauge the popularity of the president. Mass rallies are no substitute for reliable polling and a free media. I have the impression that many pro-govt demos are organised in peoples' workplaces and that attendance is compulsory. "Creative" camera angles have been employed to give an impression of large crowds.

It is possible that Assad still enjoys the support of the majority. But several people I spoke to estimated that 30%-40% was about right.

From CarefulReader:

An honest question about journalism: Do you think that your own political leanings and/or those of people you befriended in Syria influence your view of the issue.

E.g. I notice you say "Lots of circumstantial evidence that adds up to significant doubts", when you could just as well say "There is no real evidence that the government was behind it", and it would be equally correct based on the available evidence. You also use the opposition numbers of victims among demonstrator without qualification, though there is currently no way to independently confirm them.

Is this slight bias in favor of the opposition a consequence of your own political leaning, or is it based on any concrete evidence? Do you think a reporter should (or even could) avoid having his political leaning and hunches influence his reporting?

From IanBlack:

My job is to try to describe/ assess/analyze/contextualise what is happening. Clearly different ppl have different views in situation of conflict. U cld say "there is no real evidence that govt was behind" bombings. but it is i think more accurate to say what i did - and reflects what a lot of syrian ppl say. it's true that casualty figures cannot be confirmed - largely due to lack of access for journalists, human rights monitors etc. it is in the power of the syrian government to make it easier for outsiders to judge what is happening. hope u find that an honest answer.

The live Q&A has now ended. Thanks for all your questions and comments.

***

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